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Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching Gamest∗
Yasushi Kawase† Yutaro Yamaguchi‡ Yu Yokoi§
Abstract
We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to
potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose “accept” or “reject,” but the
decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her job at the firm, but it
may also eliminate chances of better offers from other firms in the future. We formulate this
market as a perfect-information extensive-form game played by the workers. Each instance
of this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which does not necessarily
lead to a stable matching and has some perplexing properties.
We show a dichotomy result that characterizes the complexity of computing the SPE.
The computation is tractable if each firm makes offers to at most two workers or each worker
receives offers from at most two firms. In contrast, it is PSPACE-hard even if both firms
and workers are related to at most three offers. We also study engineering aspects of this
matching market. It is shown that, for any preference profile, we can design an offering
schedule of firms so that the worker-optimal stable matching is realized in the SPE.
1 Introduction
Imagine a decentralized job market consisting of firms and workers. Each firm has one position
to fill and has a preference ordering over potential workers. Additionally, each worker has a
preference on positions. To fill a position, each firm first makes an offer to its favorite worker,
and if the offer is rejected, then the next offer is made to the second best worker, and so on. The
offers of the firms are not synchronized with each other. That is, firms act as if they simulate
an asynchronous version of the firm-oriented deferred acceptance algorithm [23, 24], which is
known to find the position-optimal stable matching just like the original synchronous version
[11]. In contrast to these algorithms, in which each worker can keep a tentative contract and
decline it when she gets a better offer, the current market does not allow tentative contracts.
Once a worker receives an offer from some firm, she must decide immediately whether to accept
or not and cannot change the decision later. Thus, the acceptance of an offer guarantees her
job at that position, but it may also eliminate chances of better offers from other firms in the
future. It is assumed that the offers are made in accordance with a prescribed schedule, i.e.,
there is a linear order on the set of all possible offers. All the workers know this order, but
whether a worker will get each scheduled offer from each firm or not depends on the actions of
other workers. Thus, this market has the sequential structure of decision problems encountered
by the strategic workers.
Our model deals with any order of offers that is consistent with every firm’s preference. In
particular, we call a market position-based if all the offers by the same firm are successively placed
in the order, i.e., there is a linear order on the set of firms according to which each firm makes all
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its offers. This case represents, for instance, an academic job market in which different positions
have different hiring seasons. Job-seeking researchers know these seasons, and they can guess
each position’s preference ordering over the candidate researchers and also each researcher’s
preference ordering over the positions. Once a researcher accepts an offer, she cannot decline
it because unilaterally rescinding a contract damages her reputation and adversely affects her
future career. The position-based case can also be interpreted as a job market in which institutes
have public invitations in different seasons and researchers strategically decide whether to apply
or not for each invitation.
We formulate this market as a perfect-information extensive-form game among the workers,
which we call the sequential matching game (a formal definition will be given in Section 2.1).
Each round of the game corresponds to an offer from a firm. The offers are made in some
fixed order. In each round, the worker who receives the offer is the player who takes an action,
where the possible actions are ACCEPT and REJECT. If the worker chooses ACCEPT, then the firm
and the worker are matched and leave the market, and we move to a subgame in which they
are removed. If the worker chooses REJECT, then they stay in the market, and we move to a
subgame in which that worker is eliminated from the preference list of the firm. The game ends
if there is no firm with a nonempty list. Each strategy profile uniquely defines a matching, or an
assignment obtained at the end of the game. Each worker’s preference over outcome matchings
depends only on her own assignment.
This paper investigates a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this sequential matching
game, i.e., an action profile that represents the best actions of the workers in all rounds under the
assumption that all the other workers will take their best actions in the future. For every offer,
different actions result in different outcomes for the worker: by rejecting an offer, it is impossible
for her to obtain the same assignment afterwards. Hence, the best action is defined uniquely at
each round by backward induction. Therefore, any instance of the sequential matching game
has a unique SPE. To clarify the setting, we provide a small example here.
Example 1.1. There are three research institutes p1, p2, and p3 each of which has one position
to fill. Three job-seeking researchers q1, q2, and q3 are awaiting offers. The institutes have prefer-
ences on acceptable candidates, and researchers have preferences on possible institutes as follows:
p1 : q1 q1 : p2 ≻q1 p1
p2 : q2 ≻p2 q1 ≻p2 q3 q2 : p3 ≻q2 p2
p3 : q3 ≻p3 q2 q3 : p2 ≻q3 p3.
Each researcher prefers being matched (with an acceptable institute) to being unmatched. The
institute p1 starts scouting first, and then p2 and p3 follow in order. Thus, the following order
is defined on the offers.
The offering order : (p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p2, q1), (p2, q3), (p3, q3), (p3, q2),
where offers related to previously matched institutes or researchers are skipped.
When the first offer (p1, q1) is made, q1 has two possible actions. If she selects ACCEPT, then
she is assigned to p1 in the outcome matching. If she selects REJECT, she has to anticipate what
happens after the rejection (see Fig. 1). After q1’s rejection, p1 leaves the market because it has
no other candidate. Then p2 makes an offer to q2, and q2 may select ACCEPT or REJECT. Under
the assumption that all workers similarly take the best actions by anticipating other workers’
future actions, it is concluded that q1 would be unmatched in the outcome if she rejects (p1, q1).
Thus, ACCEPT is her best action in the first round. In this manner, we can define the best action
for each round. Fig. 1 shows all possible rounds, and red edges represent the best actions. The
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Figure 1: The tree representation of the game. The bold red edges indicate the SPE.
SPE of this instance then results in an assignment that matches pairs {(p1, q1), (p2, q3), (p3, q2)}.
Note that this does not coincide with a unique stable matching {(p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p3, q3)} under
this preference profile.
Recently, a sequential game on a matching instance has been studied actively under various
settings [30, 3, 4, 5, 26, 31, 15]. In many of those settings, it has been shown that the SPE
leads to a stable matching. However, such a characterization of the SPE does not hold in our
setting. Indeed, the outcome matching of the above example is unstable. Moreover, we will see in
Section 2.3 that the outcome matching in our setting may violate not only the standard stability
but also weaker stabilities such as vNM-stability [10] and essential stability [19]. Besides, unlike
many other models, the outcome matching of the SPE changes drastically depending on the
order of offers in our model. We also see in Section 2.3 that not only the matching itself but also
the set of matched firms and workers may change, i.e., there is no “rural hospital theorem”-like
property. These distinctive features indicate the difficulty in capturing SPEs in our model.
This paper studies SPEs of the sequential matching game from two different perspectives:
equilibrium computation and indirect market regulation. In the first part (Sections 3 and 4),
we reveal the complexity of computing the outcome matching of the SPE for a given preference
profile and a given offering order. That is, we analyze how hard it is to predict the market
outcome assuming that all the workers follow their best strategies. In the second part (Sections 5
and 6), we see our model from an engineering perspective. For a given preference profile, we
consider designing an offering order so that the outcome matching of the SPE admits a certain
socially desirable property, e.g., stability. Here we describe the details of each part.
Equilibrium Computation
In the first part, we consider the complexity of computing an SPE in our model. Note that rep-
resenting an SPE itself obviously requires exponential time since the tree representation has ex-
ponential size. Therefore, it is more reasonable to consider the following decision problem: given
an instance and a history (a possible sequence of actions), decide whether the next player selects
ACCEPT or not in the SPE. Note that each subgame of a given instance is again an instance of the
sequential matching game. Then, we would rather consider the following equivalent problem.
Problem 1.2 (SPEM). Given an instance of the sequential matching game, decide whether the
first offered worker selects ACCEPT or not in the SPE.
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We call this decision problem SPEM. Note that the outcome matching of the SPE, which we
call the SPE matching, can be obtained by solving SPEM repeatedly. Conversely, SPEM is solved
if we can compute the SPE matching. We classify subclasses of SPEM by the maximum length
of the preference lists of firms and of workers. For positive integers s and t, the problem (s, t)-
SPEM is the restriction of SPEM in which the preference list of each firm and that of each worker
have at most s and t entries, respectively. Moreover, (s,∞)-SPEM and (∞, t)-SPEM denote the
restrictions in which only one side has a limitation on the list length. We provide the following
dichotomy theorem that completely characterizes the computational complexity of (s, t)-SPEM
for all s and t.
Theorem 1.3. The problem (s, t)-SPEM can be solved in polynomial time if s ≤ 2 or t ≤ 2.
Otherwise, it is PSPACE-complete.
For the above theorem, we show the tractability of (2,∞)-SPEM and (∞, 2)-SPEM in Section 3
and the PSPACE-completeness of (3, 3)-SPEM in Section 4.
We will first show that both (2,∞)-SPEM and (∞, 2)-SPEM are in the complexity class P
by providing an efficient algorithm to compute the SPE matching. As we have observed in
the above example, the SPE matching of an (∞, 2)-SPEM instance is not necessarily stable.
However, fortunately, we can compute it by an algorithm based on the deferred acceptance
algorithm, which we call the sequentially fixing deferred acceptance algorithm (SFDA). This
algorithm repeatedly computes the worker-optimal stable matching and fixes the matched pair
that appears first in the offering order. The correctness of SFDA implies that, whenever a
worker receives an offer from some firm, her best action is ACCEPT if and only if she is assigned
to that firm in the worker-optimal stable matching of the “current” subgame, rather than of
the original instance. SFDA also works for (2,∞)-SPEM, i.e., it outputs the SPE matching.
Furthermore, we can show that for (2,∞)-SPEM, the output of SFDA coincides with the worker-
optimal stable matching independently of the offering order. Hence, for (2,∞)-SPEM, the SPE
matching is exactly the worker-optimal stable matching.
In contrast to the above tractable cases, the problem (3, 3)-SPEM is far from tractable. Ac-
tually, we show that it is PSPACE-hard, which means that there exists no polynomial-time
algorithm to solve it unless P = PSPACE. Our proof is based on a reduction from QUANTIFIED
3SAT, which is a PSPACE-complete problem. Even if each preference list is of length at most
three, sequential matching games have a messy structure, which enables us to construct gadgets
simulating logic gates such as NOT, OR, and AND.
Order Design for Socially Desirable Matchings
As mentioned above, in general the SPE matching in our model can be far from stable. Moreover,
the SPE matching does not attain other criteria of social welfare such as Pareto-efficiency and
first-choice maximality. On the other hand, as we will show in Example 2.5 (Section 2.1), the
SPE matching may differ according to offering orders. These facts give rise to the following
question. “Can we lead the market into socially desirable status by designing an appropriate
offering schedule?” This is the issue investigated in the second part.
Let put ourselves in the position of a central authority who can partially control the market
by regulating an offering schedule of firms. Suppose that we cannot regulate the behaviors of
the workers but we can elicit their true preferences. We first observe preferences of firms and
workers and then design an offering schedule, i.e., an offering order, which should be consistent
to each firm’s preference. The market process proceeds on the instance that consists of the
observed preference profile and the designed offering order. Our purpose is to design an offering
order such that a desirable matching is obtained in the SPE, i.e., we aim to set up the market
so that the workers’ strategic behaviors result in larger social welfare.
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Specifically, we will focus on the following criteria: stability, Pareto-efficiency, and first-
choice maximality. Arguably, stability is the most important criterion in two-sided matching
markets, which represents a kind of fairness for all firms and workers. A stable matching
is called worker-optimal (resp., firm-optimal) if it is most preferred by workers (resp., firms)
among all the stable matchings. Worker-side Pareto-efficiency is also a well-discussed criterion
when much emphasis is put on workers’ welfare [1, 2, 18]. In some applications, worker-side
first-choice maximality attracts a significant interest, where this criterion requires that the
number of workers assigned to their first choices is maximized [8]. Firm-side Pareto-efficiency
and firm-side first-choice maximality are symmetrically defined.
Unfortunately, in Section 6, it turns out that most of these criteria cannot be realized
in the SPE in general. For each of them except worker-optimal stability, we can provide a
preference profile such that no offering order yields the SPE matching satisfying the desired
property. These impossibility results imply the hardness of controlling the behaviors of workers
by indirect regulation, i.e., designing firms’ offering schedule.
Surprisingly, however, we discover that the worker-optimal stable matching can be achieved
in the SPE for any preference profile. The following theorem is shown in Section 5.
Theorem 1.4. Given a preference profile, one can construct an offering order so that the SPE
matching is the worker-optimal stable matching.
We prove this theorem by giving an efficient algorithm for constructing a desired offering
order in the statement, which is two-phased and intuitively as follows. We first make the firms
offer to all the workers preferable to their partners in the worker-optimal stable matching. The
rest of the offers are position-based, which is defined according to the order of being matched
in the worker-oriented deferred acceptance algorithm.
It is worth remarking that Theorem 1.4 has no assumption on the lengths of preference lists.
This positive result somewhat compensates for the strong negative results in the first part. While
SPE matchings are hard to compute and have perplexing properties in general, a regulation of
firms’ offering schedule can lead them to be stable for any preference profile.
Related Work
The complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium in normal form games has been well studied in
the context of algorithmic game theory [25]. However, little work has been done on a subgame
perfect equilibrium in extensive-form games. It is known that computing an SPE is PSPACE-
complete for the sequential versions of unrelated machine scheduling, congestion games [21],
and cost sharing games [6].
In the context of economics, the outcomes generated by decentralized matching markets have
been studied under various conditions [30, 3, 4, 5, 26, 31, 15, 16]. Most existing studies have
analyzed when a decentralized market will yield a stable matching. Haeringer and Wooders [15]
considered a similar setting to ours: in each stage, each firm offers a position to a worker, and
then each worker irrevocably chooses whether to accept one of the received offers or to reject
all of them. Roughly speaking, their game is based on a synchronous version of the deferred
acceptance algorithm, while our game is based on an asynchronous version. They claimed
that, when the workers sequentially decide their actions in each stage, every SPE results in the
worker-optimal stable matching [15, Theorem 2], but this claim has been proven not true in the
present study (see Remark 2.6 for details).
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
In this section, we give a formal definition of the sequential matching game. The game is
played by a sequential process of acceptance/rejection for offers in a matching instance, and is
formulated as a perfect-information extensive-form game.
A matching instance is a tuple I = (P,Q,E,≻), where each component is defined as follows.
There are a finite set of firms P = {p1, . . . , pn} and a finite set of workers Q = {q1, . . . , qm}.
Each firm has one position, and we often identify each firm with its position. The set of
acceptable pairs is denoted by E ⊆ P × Q. For e = (p, q) ∈ E, let us define ∂P (e) :− p and
∂Q(e) :− q. For each firm p ∈ P and each worker q ∈ Q, the acceptable partner sets are denoted
by ΓI(p) :− {q
′ ∈ Q | (p, q′) ∈ E} and by ΓI(q) :− {p
′ ∈ P | (p′, q) ∈ E}, respectively. The set
of acceptable pairs that contain p ∈ P and q ∈ Q are denoted by δI(p) :− {e ∈ E | ∂P (e) = p}
and δI(q) :− {e ∈ E | ∂Q(e) = q}, respectively. Each r ∈ P ∪Q has a strict ordinal preference
≻r over ΓI(r), and ≻ denotes the profile (≻r)r∈P∪Q. We sometimes write (p, q) ≻p (p, q
′) to
denote q ≻p q
′ for p ∈ P .
A mapping µ : P ∪Q→ P ∪Q is called a matching in I = (P,Q,E,≻) if µ(r) ∈ ΓI(r)∪ {r}
and µ(µ(r)) = r for every r ∈ P∪Q. A firm or worker r ∈ P∪Q is said to bematched (with µ(r))
if µ(r) 6= r, and to be unmatched if µ(r) = r. For each r ∈ P ∪Q and two matchings µ1 and µ2,
we write µ1 ≻r µ2 if µ1(r) ≻r µ2(r), where we suppose that r is virtually added to the bottom
of the preference ≻r over ΓI(r) (i.e., each r prefers to be matched to an acceptable partner
rather than to be unmatched). A matching µ in I is often identified with the corresponding
set of acceptable pairs {(p, µ(p)) | p ∈ P, µ(p) 6= p} = {(µ(q), q) | q ∈ Q, µ(q) 6= q}. Let MI
denote the set of all matchings in I.
A sequential matching game1 is defined by a pair of a matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻)
and an offering order σ over E, which is a bijection from {1, . . . , |E|} to E. We assume that
σ is consistent with (≻p)p∈P , i.e., if σ(i), σ(j) ∈ δI(p) and σ(i) ≻p σ(j) then i < j. We denote
the set of all consistent orders by ΣI . We say that σ ∈ ΣI is induced by a position order
π : {1, . . . , |P |} → P (which is also a bijection) if π−1(p) < π−1(p′) implies σ−1(e) < σ−1(e′)
for all p, p′ ∈ P , e ∈ δI(p), and e
′ ∈ δI(p
′). In addition, we say that σ (or the game (I, σ)) is
position-based if σ is induced by some position order.
We introduce two fundamental operations on a sequential matching game. For a set X and
an element e ∈ X, we simply denote X \ {e} by X − e.
Definition 2.1 (Deletion). Let e ∈ E be an acceptable pair in a matching instance I =
(P,Q,E,≻). The deletion of e from I is defined as I − e :− (P,Q,E − e,≻′), where ≻′r is the
preference over ΓI−e(r) that is consistent with ≻r for each r ∈ P ∪ Q, i.e., s ≻
′
r t if and only
if s ≻r t for every s, t ∈ ΓI−e(r). For an order σ over E, the deletion of e from σ is an order
σ − e over E − e that is consistent with σ, i.e., (σ − e)−1(e1) < (σ − e)
−1(e2) if and only if
σ−1(e1) < σ
−1(e2) for every e1, e2 ∈ E − e.
Definition 2.2 (Contraction). Let e = (p, q) ∈ E be an acceptable pair in a matching instance
I = (P,Q,E,≻). The contraction of I by e is defined as I/e :− (P − p,Q− q,E/e,≻′), where
E/e :− E \ (δI(p) ∪ δI(q)), and ≻
′
r is the preference over ΓI/e(r) that is consistent with ≻r for
each r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q − q). For an order σ over E, the contraction of σ by e is an order σ/e
over E/e that is consistent to σ.
Observation 2.3. Deletion and contraction are commutative. That is, for any two disjoint
pairs e1, e2 ∈ E, we have (I/e1)− e2 = (I − e2)/e1 and (σ/e1)− e2 = (σ − e2)/e1.
1We also use the term “sequential matching game” to refer the set of all games defined in this way.
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Let e = (p, q) ∈ E. For a matching µ′ in I/e, we denote by µ′ + e the matching µ in I such
that µ(p) = q, µ(q) = p, and µ(r) = µ′(r) for every r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q − q). Conversely, for a
matching µ in I with µ(p) = q and µ(q) = p, we denote by µ − e the matching µ′ in I/e such
that µ′(r) = µ(r) for every r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q− q). Note that these can be regarded as ordinary
set operations: an element e is added to a set µ′ and removed from a set µ, respectively.
The game (I, σ) is recursively defined as follows. Let σ(1) = e = (p, q). In the first round, p
offers to q, and q chooses ACCEPT or REJECT for the offer. If q chooses ACCEPT, then p and q are
matched irrevocably, and then (I/e, σ/e) is played (i.e., the outcome is µ′+e for some matching
µ′ in I/e). If q chooses REJECT, then p and q are unmatched irrevocably, and then (I − e, σ− e)
is played (i.e., the outcome is some matching in I − e). As we have already seen in Fig. 1, this
process can be represented by a rooted tree, where the root corresponds to the first round of
the game (I, σ), and each node (except the leaves) corresponds to a game (I ′, σ′) and has two
children corresponding to the two subgames (I ′/σ′(1), σ′/σ′(1)) and (I ′− σ′(1), σ′ − σ′(1)). We
call this tree the tree representation of the game (I, σ).
We consider a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the sequential matching game. A
strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium of every subgame
of the original game. In every round of the game, the two actions ACCEPT and REJECT for an
offer (p, q) result in different outcome matchings, say µ1 and µ2, respectively. One of them is
preferred to the other by the worker q, because µ1(q) = p 6= µ2(q). Hence, the optimal strategy
is uniquely defined in each subgame by backward induction, and every game admits a unique
SPE. The outcome matching according to the SPE of a game (I, σ) is called the SPE matching
of (I, σ), which is denoted by SPE(I, σ). The next property immediately follows from the above
definitions.
Proposition 2.4. For e = (p, q) = σ(1) in any sequential matching game (I, σ), we have the
following properties.
(a) If SPE(I − e, σ − e)(q) ≻q p, then SPE(I, σ) = SPE(I − e, σ − e).
(b) If SPE(I − e, σ − e)(q) ≺q p, then SPE(I, σ) = SPE(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q).
Example 2.5. Let us formulate Example 1.1 as a sequential matching game (I, σ) with I =
(P,Q,E,≻). The firm set is P = {p1, p2, p3} and the worker set is Q = {q1, q2, q3}. The set of
acceptable pairs is
E = {(p1, q1), (p2, q1), (p2, q2), (p2, q3), (p3, q2), (p3, q3)},
and the preferences (≻r)r∈P∪Q are
p1 : q1 q1 : p2 ≻q1 p1
p2 : q2 ≻p2 q1 ≻p2 q3 q2 : p3 ≻q2 p2
p3 : q3 ≻p3 q2 q3 : p2 ≻q3 p3.
The offering order σ ∈ ΣI is(
σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(6)
)
=
(
(p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p2, q1), (p2, q3), (p3, q3), (p3, q2)
)
.
We can also see that σ is induced by a position order π : {1, 2, 3} → P such that (π(1), π(2), π(3)) =
(p1, p2, p3). As seen in Example 1.1 (see the tree representation in Fig. 1), the SPE matching is
SPE(I, σ) = {(p1, q1), (p2, q3), (p3, q2)}.
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Let us demonstrate that a different offering order may result in a different SPE matching even
if the matching instance is exactly the same. Consider the above instance I, and let σ′ ∈ ΣI be(
σ′(1), σ′(2), . . . , σ′(6)
)
=
(
(p2, q2), (p2, q1), (p2, q3), (p3, q3), (p3, q2), (p1, q1)
)
.
Note that this σ′ is also position-based (induced by a position order π′ with (π′(1), π′(2), π′(3)) =
(p2, p3, p1)). The tree representation of (I, σ
′) is shown in Fig. 2, and the SPE matching is
SPE(I, σ′) = {(p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p3, q3)}.
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Figure 2: The tree representation of (I, σ′). The bold red edges indicate the SPE.
As mentioned in definition, for any sequential matching game, a unique SPE can be com-
puted by the backward induction algorithm. The computational time is, however, exponential
in the input size because the tree representation has exponential size.
In this paper, we consider the problem of deciding whether ∂Q(σ(1)) selects ACCEPT in the
first round. We call this problem SPEM as defined in Problem 1.2. The restriction of SPEM in
which the numbers of acceptable partners of each firm and of each worker are at most s and t,
respectively, is denoted by (s, t)-SPEM.
Remark 2.6. In [15], similar sequential matching games were considered, and there are several
differences between their models and ours. The most similar setting was studied in [15, Section
4], where the only difference is that, after all firms have offered (where each firm offers to the
most preferred worker among the workers to whom it has never offered), the workers choose their
actions (either to accept exactly one offer and reject the rest or to reject all offers) sequentially
in a prespecified order.
For instance, let us consider the matching instance I in Example 2.5. In the first stage, each
firm pi offers to qi (i = 1, 2, 3). Suppose that the first decision maker is q1. If q1 rejects p1’s offer,
then q2 and q3 should accept the offers they received, because otherwise they will be unmatched.
In this case, q1 will be unmatched (no other firm will offer to q1), and hence q1 should conclude
to accept p1’s offer. Then, q2 and q3 can reject the offers from p2 and p3, respectively, and they
subsequently receive offers from p3 and p2, which are, respectively, their preferred firms, in the
second stage. Thus the SPE of this game yields a matching {(p1, q1), (p2, q3), (p3, q2)}, which
is the same as SPE(I, σ) in Example 2.5.
In [15, Theorem 2], it is claimed that such a game enjoys a unique SPE, and it results in
the worker-optimal stable matching (which is formally defined in the next section). However,
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this claim is not true, as evidenced by the above example, in which the worker-optimal stable
matching in I (as well as a unique stable matching) is {(p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p3, q3)}.
2.2 Stability and Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
In this section, we briefly overview the stability and deferred acceptance algorithm (see [20, 14,
29, 22] for more details). Let I = (P,Q,E,≻) be a matching instance.
Definition 2.7 (Stability [11]). For a matching µ ∈ MI , an acceptable pair e = (p, q) ∈ E is
called a blocking pair (or blocks µ) if q ≻p µ(p) and p ≻q µ(q) (where recall that each r ∈ P ∪Q
is regarded as the bottom of the preference ≻r). A matching µ ∈ MI is said to be stable if
there exists no blocking pair for µ, and unstable otherwise.
The following statement is a one-to-one setting version of the rural hospital theorem [12, 27,
28], which is well-known in the many-to-one stable matching setting.
Theorem 2.8 (Invariance of unmatched agents [23]). If there exists a stable matching in I
under which r ∈ P ∪ Q is matched (resp., unmatched), then r is matched (resp., unmatched)
under every stable matching in I.
For µ, µ′ ∈ MI , we write µ Q µ
′ if µ(q) q µ
′(q) (∀q ∈ Q), and write µ ≻Q µ
′ if µ 6= µ′ in
addition. It is easy to observe that Q is a partial order over MI . Subject to stability in I, a
maximal (minimal) element with respect to this partial order is unique.
Definition 2.9 (Optimality [20] (attributed to J. H. Conway)). The set of all stable matchings
in I forms a distributive lattice with respect to the partial order Q.
2 A unique maximal
element in this distributive lattice is said to be worker-optimal or Q-optimal, and denoted by
QOPT(I). That is, QOPT(I)(q) q µ(q) for any stable matching µ in I and any worker q ∈ Q.
The worker-optimal stable matching can be computed by the well-known deferred acceptance
(DA) algorithm [11], which is described in Algorithm 1. Through the algorithm, the proposal
with respect to each pair e = (p, q) ∈ E and its rejection occur at most once in Lines 4 and 7,
respectively, and the number of comparisons with respect to ≻p in Line 6 is equal to the number
of workers rejected by p in Line 7. Hence, the algorithm requires O(|E|) time in total.
We here show several properties on the worker-optimal stable matchings, which will be
utilized in Sections 3 and 5.
Property 2.10. For p ∈ P and q ∈ Q, if q is on the top of p’s list, then QOPT(I)(q) q p.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that QOPT(I)(q) ≺q p. We then have QOPT(I)(p) ≺p q as
QOPT(I)(p) 6= q, and hence (p, q) is a blocking pair, contradicting the stability of QOPT(I).
Property 2.11. For e = (p, q) ∈ E, if QOPT(I)(q) = p, then QOPT(I)(q) ≻q QOPT(I−e)(q).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that QOPT(I − e)(q) ≻q QOPT(I)(q) = p. Since QOPT(I − e)
is a stable matching in I− e, any e′ ∈ E− e is not a blocking pair. Then, QOPT(I− e) is also a
stable matching in I, because e cannot be a blocking pair (due to QOPT(I − e)(q) ≻q p). This
contradicts the Q-optimality of QOPT(I).
Property 2.12. For e = (p, q) ∈ E, if QOPT(I)(q) = p, then QOPT(I/e) + (p, q) Q
QOPT(I).
2For every two matchings µ, µ′ ∈ MI , there exist µ ∨ µ
′ := min{ν ∈ MI | ν Q µ and ν Q µ
′} and
µ ∧ µ′ := max{ν ∈ MI | ν Q µ and ν Q µ
′}. In addition, for every three matchings µ, µ′, µ′ ∈ MI , we have
µ ∨ (µ′ ∧ µ′′) = (µ ∨ µ′) ∧ (µ ∨ µ′′) and µ ∧ (µ′ ∨ µ′′) = (µ ∧ µ′) ∨ (µ ∧ µ′′).
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Algorithm 1: Q-oriented DA [11]
input: A matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻)
output: The Q-optimal stable matching QOPT(I)
1 Set Iˆ ← I and µ(r)← r for each r ∈ P ∪Q;
2 while ∃q ∈ Q such that µ(q) = q and ΓIˆ(q) 6= ∅ do
3 for each q ∈ Q such that µ(q) = q and ΓIˆ(q) 6= ∅ do
4 Set to µ(q) the most preferred firm in ΓIˆ(q) (q proposes to µ(q) ∈ P );
5 for each p ∈ P such that ∃q ∈ Q with µ(q) = p do
6 Set to µ(p) the most preferred worker in {q ∈ Q | µ(q) = p} (among the workers
who have proposed to p);
7 µ(q)← q and Iˆ ← Iˆ − (p, q) for each q ∈ Q such that µ(q) = p and µ(p) 6= q (p
irrevocably rejects q’s proposal);
8 return µ;
Proof. Let µ :− QOPT(I)− e. Since QOPT(I) is stable in I, there is no pair e′ = (p′, q′) ∈ E/e
such that q′ ≻p′ µ(p
′) and p′ ≻q′ µ(q
′), which implies that µ is stable in I/e. By Q-optimality,
we have QOPT(I/e) Q−q µ, and hence QOPT(I/e) + (p, q) Q µ+ (p, q) = QOPT(I).
Property 2.13. For e = (p, q) ∈ E, if QOPT(I)(q) ≻q p, then QOPT(I) = QOPT(I − e).
Proof. Since QOPT(I) is stable in I − e, we have QOPT(I) Q QOPT(I − e) by Q-optimality.
Then, p ≺q QOPT(I)(q) q QOPT(I − e)(q), and hence e = (p, q) cannot be a blocking pair
for QOPT(I − e). Thus QOPT(I− e) is also stable in I, and hence QOPT(I) Q QOPT(I− e)
by Q-optimality.
2.3 Perplexing Properties of SPE Matchings
In this section, we demonstrate how difficult to capture SPE matchings in the sequential match-
ing game is. Specifically, we show several more properties that may not be achieved with concrete
examples. The contents are not directly related to the main results, and the readers who are
convinced enough by Example 1.1 can skip this section.
The first one claims that SPE matchings do not satisfy a “rural hospital theorem”-like
property (cf. Theorem 2.8) in contrast to stable matchings.
Proposition 2.14. There exists a matching instance such that the set of firms and workers
matched in the SPE matching changes according to the offering order.
Example 2.15 (Proof of Proposition 2.14). Consider a matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻)
with four firms P = {p1, p2, p3, p4} and four workers Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4}. The set of acceptable
pairs is
E = {(p1, q1), (p1, q2), (p1, q4), (p2, q2), (p2, q4), (p3, q1), (p3, q3), (p4, q4)}
and the preferences are
p1 : q2 ≻p1 q1 ≻p1 q4 q1 : p1 ≻q1 p3
p2 : q4 ≻p2 q2 q2 : p2 ≻q2 p1
p3 : q1 ≻p3 q3 q3 : p3
p4 : q4 q4 : p1 ≻q4 p4 ≻q4 p2.
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Let σ1 and σ2 be offering orders that are respectively induced by position orders π1 and π2 such
that(
π1(1), π1(2), π1(3), π1(4)
)
= (p1, p2, p3, p4) and
(
π2(1), π2(2), π2(3), π2(4)
)
= (p4, p3, p2, p1).
Then, the SPE matchings are
SPE(I, σ1) = {(p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p3, q3), (p4, q4)} and SPE(I, σ2) = {(p1, q4), (p2, q2), (p3, q1)}.
Hence, the set of matched firms and workers (and even its size) is changed.
Example 2.16 (Alternative proof of Proposition 2.14). In the previous example, the larger
matching is stable, but this is not always true. Consider a matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻)
with four firms P = {p1, p2, p3, p4} and four workers Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4}. The set of acceptable
pairs is
E = {(p1, q1), (p1, q2), (p1, q3), (p2, q2), (p2, q4), (p3, q2), (p3, q3), (p4, q1)}
and the preferences are
p1 : q2 ≻p1 q1 ≻p1 q3 q1 : p1 ≻q1 p4
p2 : q2 ≻p2 q4 q2 : p3 ≻q2 p2 ≻q2 p1
p3 : q3 ≻p3 q2 q3 : p1 ≻q3 p3
p4 : q1 q4 : p2.
Let σ1 and σ2 be offering orders that are respectively induced by position orders π1 and π2 such
that(
π1(1), π1(2), π1(3), π1(4)
)
= (p1, p2, p3, p4) and
(
π2(1), π2(2), π2(3), π2(4)
)
= (p2, p4, p1, p3).
Then, the SPE matchings are
SPE(I, σ1) = {(p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p3, q3)} and SPE(I, σ2) = {(p1, q3), (p2, q4), (p3, q2), (p4, q1)}.
Hence, the set of matched firms and workers (and even its size) is changed, and in this case,
the smaller matching is stable. Moreover, by combining the above instance with that in Exam-
ple 2.15, one can construct a matching instance such that the set of SPE matchings with all
offering orders includes (i) a matching smaller than its stable matchings, (ii) a matching larger
than them, and (iii) a matching incomparable to them in the sense of the set of matched firms
and workers.
The second one is on stability; we already observe in Example 1.1 that an SPE matching may
not be stable in the standard sense (Definition 2.7), and this is also true for weaker stabilities,
which are defined in Definitions 2.17 and 2.19.
Definition 2.17 (von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stability [10]). For matchings µ, µ′ ∈ MI ,
we say that µ dominates µ′ if some pair (p, q) ∈ µ blocks µ′, i.e., q ≻p µ
′(p) and p ≻q µ
′(q).
A nonempty set of matchings V ⊆ MI is called a vNM-stable set if it satisfies the following
two properties: (internal stability) any µ ∈ V does not dominate another µ′ ∈ V ; (external
stability) any µ′ ∈ MI \ V is dominated by some µ ∈ V . It is known that V is uniquely
determined [10, 33]. We say that µ ∈ MI is a vNM-stable matching or satisfies vNM-stability
if µ ∈ V .
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Remark 2.18. The vNM-stable set also forms a distributive lattice, which includes all stable
matchings. Hence, the worker-optimal vNM-stable matching is defined, and all workers weakly
prefer it to the worker-optimal stable matching. Furthermore, it is also worker-side Pareto-
efficient (see Definition 6.2 in Section 6).
Definition 2.19 (Essential stability [19]). For a matching µ ∈ MI and a blocking pair (p0, q0)
for µ, the reassignment chain initiated by q0 is the list q0, p0, q1, p1, . . . , qℓ, pℓ defined as follows:
let µ0 :− µ, and for each k = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ,
µk(q) :−


µk−1(q) (q 6= qk−1, µk−1(pk−1))
pk−1 (q = qk−1)
q (q = µk−1(pk−1) =: qk),
and let pk be qk’s most preferred position subject to the condition that (pk, qk) blocks µk, where
ℓ ≥ 1 is defined so that µℓ(pℓ) = pℓ and µk(pk) 6= pk for all k < ℓ. We say that a blocking
pair (p0, q0) is vacuous for q0 if µℓ(q0) 6= p0. A matching µ ∈ MI is essentially stable for the
workers3 if all blocking pairs (p, q) for µ are vacuous for q.
Proposition 2.20. There exists an SPE matching that is neither vNM-stable nor essentially
stable.
Example 2.21 (Proof of Proposition 2.20). Consider a matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻)
with three firms P = {p1, p2, p3} and three workers Q = {q1, q2, q3}. The set of acceptable pairs
is
E = {(p1, q1), (p1, q2), (p2, q1), (p2, q2), (p2, q3), (p3, q1), (p3, q3)}
and the preferences are
p1 : q1 ≻p1 q2 q1 : p3 ≻q1 p1 ≻q1 p2
p2 : q1 ≻p2 q2 ≻p2 q3 q2 : p2 ≻q2 p1
p3 : q3 ≻p3 q1 q3 : p2 ≻q3 p3.
Let σ be an offering order that is induced by a position order π such that(
π(1), π(2), π(3)
)
= (p1, p2, p3).
Then, SPE(I, σ) = {(p1, q2), (p2, q3), (p3, q1)}, while the vNM-stable set is a singleton consist-
ing of {(p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p3, q3)}. Hence, the SPE matching does not satisfy vNM-stability.
Moreover, this SPE matching is not essentially stable because a unique blocking pair (p2, q2) is
non-vacuous both for the workers and for the firms.
3 Algorithm for Tractable Cases of SPE Computation
As one side of our main dichotomy result Theorem 1.3, we show the following theorem. Recall
that (2,∞)-SPEM (resp., (∞, 2)-SPEM) is the restriction of SPEM in which the length of each firm’s
(resp., worker’s) preference list is at most two.
Theorem 3.1. The problems (2,∞)-SPEM and (∞, 2)-SPEM are polynomially solvable.
3The essential stability for the firms are defined symmetrically.
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Note that, for an instance (I, σ), we can solve SPEM efficiently if we can compute SPE(I, σ)
efficiently, because whether ∂Q(σ(1)) selects ACCEPT at the first round or not corresponds to
whether σ(1) ∈ SPE(I, σ) holds or not. Therefore, to show Theorem 3.1, it suffices to prove the
following theorem, which is the purpose of this section.
Theorem 3.2. For any (2,∞)-SPEM or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance (I, σ), we can compute the SPE
matching SPE(I, σ) in polynomial time.
We show Theorem 3.2 in the following way. In Section 3.1, we introduce an efficient algo-
rithm, which we call the (Q-oriented) sequentially fixing deferred acceptance algorithm (SFDA),
and provide its properties. Then, Section 3.2 shows that the output of SFDA for (I, σ) coincides
with SPE(I, σ) if (I, σ) is a (2,∞)- or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance.
3.1 Sequentially Fixing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
This section introduces the (Q-oriented) sequentially fixing deferred acceptance algorithm (SFDA),
which is sketched as follows: given an instance (I, σ), the algorithm repeatedly computes the
Q-optimal stable matching and updates the instance by removing the firm-worker pair that ap-
pears first in the offering order among all the matched pairs. The algorithm stops the repetition
when there is no acceptable pair, and then outputs the matching that consists of all the pairs
removed so far. We denote the output matching by SFDA(I, σ). The formal description of
SFDA is given in Algorithm 2. Recall that QOPT(I) in the description denotes the Q-optimal
stable matching of a matching instance I, which is computed by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2: Q-oriented SFDA
input: An instance (I, σ), where I = (P,Q,E,≻)
output: A matching SFDA(I, σ)
1 Set (Iˆ , σˆ)← (I, σ) and let µ(r)← r for every r ∈ P ∪Q;
2 while there is some acceptable pair in Iˆ do
3 Let e = (p, q) be the pair that minimizes σ−1(e) subject to e ∈ QOPT(Iˆ);
4 (Iˆ , σˆ)← (Iˆ/e, σˆ/e);
5 µ(p)← q and µ(q)← p;
6 return µ;
The algorithm SFDA is inspired by the (Q-oriented) efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance
algorithm (EADA), which is introduced by Kesten [18] and simplified by Bando [7] and Tang
and Yu [32]. While EADA iteratively fixes a last proposer4 under DA, our algorithm SFDA
fixes the minimum pair in the predetermined order σ. EADA produces the worker-optimal
vNM-stable matching, and hence SFDA also produces it if the order σ is consistent with the
fixing order in EADA.
For any SPEM instance (I, σ) where I = (P,Q,E,≻), the output matching SFDA(I, σ) has
the following properties.
Lemma 3.3. SFDA(I, σ) Q QOPT(I) for any SPEM instance (I, σ).
Proof. We use induction on subgames. Let e = (p, q) be the first pair chosen at Line 3 in Algo-
rithm 2. Then, SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q). Since SFDA(I/e, σ/e) Q QOPT(I/e)
4This is a modified version of the algorithm EADA in [7]. In [7], the set of all last proposers is fixed at a time,
while, in this version, only one of them is fixed. Fortunately, this modification does not change the outcome.
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by induction, then SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I/e, σ/e)+(p, q) Q QOPT(I/e)+(p, q) Q QOPT(I),
where the last relation follows from Property 2.12.
Lemma 3.4. For e = (p, q) = σ(1) in any SPEM instance (I, σ), we have the following properties.
(a) If QOPT(I)(q) 6= p, then SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I − e, σ − e).
(b) If QOPT(I)(q) = p, then SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q).
Proof. By definition, (b) is clear; since e = (p, q) = σ(1), the condition QOPT(I)(q) = p means
that e is the first pair chosen at Line 3, and hence SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q).
We show (a) by induction on subgames. Since e = (p, q) = σ(1) and QOPT(I)(q) 6= p,
Property 2.10 implies QOPT(I)(q) ≻q p. Then Property 2.13 implies QOPT(I) = QOPT(I−e).
Let e∗ ∈ QOPT(I) be the first pair chosen at Line 3. As QOPT(I) = QOPT(I − e), SFDA also
chooses e∗ when the input is (I − e, σ− e). By definition, SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I/e∗, σ/e∗)+ e∗
and SFDA(I − e, σ − e) = SFDA((I − e)/e∗, (σ − e)/e∗) + e∗ = SFDA((I/e∗) − e, (σ/e∗) −
e) + e∗. Note that Property 2.12 implies QOPT(I/e∗)(q) q QOPT(I)(q) ≻q p, and hence
SFDA(I/e∗, σ/e∗) = SFDA((I/e∗)−e, (σ/e∗)−e) by induction. Thus, we obtain SFDA(I, σ) =
SFDA(I − e, σ − e).
The output of SFDA depends on the order σ, i.e., we may have SFDA(I, σ) 6= SFDA(I, σ′)
if σ 6= σ′. However, the set of firms and workers matched in SFDA(I, σ) coincides with that of
QOPT(I) independently of σ, i.e., the following lemma holds (in contrast to Proposition 2.14
for SPE(I, σ)).
Lemma 3.5. For any r ∈ P ∪ Q in any SPEM instance (I, σ), we have SFDA(I, σ)(r) = r if
and only if QOPT(I)(r) = r.
Proof. We use induction on subgames. Let e = (p, q) be the first pair chosen at Line 3 in
Algorithm 2. Clearly, p and q are matched both in SFDA(I, σ) and in QOPT(I). For each
r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q − q), we have SFDA(I, σ)(r) = SFDA(I/e, σ/e)(r) by definition. Also,
by induction, we have SFDA(I/e, σ/e)(r) = r if and only if QOPT(I/e)(r) = r. Note that
QOPT(I)−(p, q) is a stable matching in I/e by the definition of the stability. Then Theorem 2.8
implies that, for each r ∈ (P − p)∪ (Q− q), QOPT(I/e)(r) = r if and only if QOPT(I)(r) = r.
Combining these, we obtain that, for every r ∈ P ∪Q, we have SFDA(I, σ)(r) = r if and only
if QOPT(I)(r) = r.
Finally, we analyze the time complexity of SFDA. The algorithm repeats finding the Q-
optimal stable matching of each updated instance, which is done in O(|E|) time by Algorithm 1
(see Section 2.2). Because one pair is fixed at each iteration stage, the number of iteration is
at most min{|P |, |Q|}. Thus, the algorithm SFDA runs in O(|E| ·min{|P |, |Q|}) time.
Lemma 3.6. For any SPEM instance (I, σ), the matching SFDA(I, σ) can be computed in poly-
nomial time.
3.2 Proof of the Tractability
This part is devoted to show the following theorem, which completes the proof of Theorem 3.2,
and hence of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.7. SFDA(I, σ) = SPE(I, σ) for any (2,∞)- or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance (I, σ).
We prove Theorem 3.7 by induction on subgames linking Lemma 3.4 and Proposition 2.4,
the inductive properties of SFDA(I, σ) and SPE(I, σ), respectively. For this purpose, we provide
the following special properties of (2,∞)- and (∞, 2)-SPEM instances.
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Lemma 3.8. SFDA(I, σ) = QOPT(I) for any (2,∞)-SPEM instance (I, σ).
Proof. We use induction on subgames. Let e = (p, q) = σ(1). There are two cases.
If QOPT(I)(q) 6= p, then SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I − e, σ − e) by Lemma 3.4 (a), and
QOPT(I) = QOPT(I−e) by Properties 2.10 and 2.13. Since QOPT(I−e) = SFDA(I−e, σ−e)
by induction, we obtain QOPT(I) = SFDA(I, σ).
If QOPT(I)(q) = p, then Lemma 3.4 (b) implies SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q),
which equals QOPT(I/e)+(p, q) by induction. Then it suffices to show QOPT(I) = QOPT(I/e)+
(p, q). Suppose, to the contrary, this equality fails. As we have QOPT(I/e)+(p, q) Q QOPT(I)
by Property 2.12, the Q-optimality of QOPT(I) implies that µ :− QOPT(I/e)+ (p, q) is unsta-
ble in I, i.e., there is (p′, q′) ∈ E with q′ ≻p′ µ(p
′) and p′ ≻q′ µ(q
′). Since QOPT(I/e) is stable
in I/e, we have (p′, q′) 6∈ E/e = E \ (δI(p) ∪ δI(q)). Hence, p
′ = p or q′ = q holds. If p′ = p,
then q′ ≻p µ(p) = q = QOPT(I)(p) and p ≻q′ µ(q
′) q′ QOPT(I)(q
′), and hence (p, q′) blocks
QOPT(I), a contradiction. Therefore, we have q′ = q and p′ 6= p, from which q ≻p′ µ(p
′) and
p′ ≻q µ(q) = p = QOPT(I)(q) follow. Since QOPT(I) is not blocked by (p
′, q′) (= (p′, q)), the
latter condition implies QOPT(I)(p′) p′ q. As we have QOPT(I)(p
′) 6= QOPT(I)(p) = q, we
obtain QOPT(I)(p′) ≻p′ q ≻p′ µ(p
′). Note that µ(p′) is not p′ itself because p′ is matched in the
stable matching QOPT(I)− (p, q) of I/e and hence in QOPT(I/e) = µ− (p, q) by Theorem 2.8
(invariance of unmatched agents). Thus, QOPT(I)(p′), q, µ(p′) ∈ Q are three different entries
of the preference list of p′, which contradicts that the list of p′ has at most two entries.
Lemma 3.9. For any (2,∞)- or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance (I, σ) and any e = (p, q) ∈ E, the
condition QOPT(I)(q) = p implies p ≻q SFDA(I − e, σ − e)(q).
Proof. In the case of (2,∞)-SPEM, the subgame (I− e, σ− e) is also a (2,∞)-SPEM instance, and
hence QOPT(I− e) = SFDA(I− e, σ− e) by Lemma 3.8. Therefore, Property 2.11 implies that
p ≻q QOPT(I − e)(q) = SFDA(I − e, σ − e)(q).
In the case of (∞, 2)-SPEM, since q’s preference list is of length at most 2, p is on the top
or the bottom of the list. If p is on the top, clearly p ≻q SFDA(I − e, σ − e)(q). If p is on
the bottom, by Property 2.11, p = QOPT(I)(q) ≻q QOPT(I − e)(q) = q. By Lemma 3.5, this
implies SFDA(I − e, σ − e)(q) = q. Thus, we have p ≻q q = SFDA(I − e, σ − e)(q).
Now we are ready to show Theorem 3.7, which states that the output of SFDA coincides
with the SPE matching for a (2,∞)- or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We show SFDA(I, σ) = SPE(I, σ) by induction on subgames. Let e =
(p, q) = σ(1). Note that for a (2,∞)-SPEM (resp., (∞, 2)-SPEM) instance (I, σ), the subgames
(I − e, σ − e) and (I/e, σ/e) are also (2,∞)-SPEM (resp., (∞, 2)-SPEM) instances. Therefore, by
induction, we have SFDA(I/e, σ/e) = SPE(I/e, σ/e) and SFDA(I−e, σ−e) = SPE(I−e, σ−e).
We consider two cases: QOPT(I)(q) 6= p and QOPT(I)(q) = p.
When QOPT(I)(q) 6= p, Property 2.10 and Lemma 3.3 imply SFDA(I, σ)(q) q QOPT(I)(q) ≻q
p. Also, Lemma 3.4 (a) implies SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I−e, σ−e) = SPE(I−e, σ−e). Therefore,
SPE(I−e, σ−e)(q) ≻q p. By Proposition 2.4 (a), SPE(I, σ) = SPE(I−e, σ−e) = SFDA(I, σ).
When QOPT(I)(q) = p, Lemma 3.4 (b) implies SFDA(I, σ) = SFDA(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q) =
SPE(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q). Since (I/e, σ/e) is a (2,∞)- or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance, by Lemma 3.9,
we have p ≻q SFDA(I − e, σ − e)(q) = SPE(I − e, σ − e)(q). By Proposition 2.4 (b), then
SPE(I, σ) = SPE(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q) = SFDA(I, σ).
In particular, for (2,∞)-SPEM, combining Theorem 3.7 and Lemma 3.8 gives the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.10. SPE(I, σ) = QOPT(I) for any (2,∞)-SPEM instance (I, σ).
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Thanks to Theorem 3.7, for any (2,∞)-SPEM or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance, we can compute the
SPE matching of a given instance by the algorithm SFDA. (In particular, for (2,∞)-SPEM, we
can compute it by DA by Corollary 3.10.) Because SFDA runs in polynomial time as shown in
Lemma 3.6, Theorem 3.7 immediately implies Theorem 3.2. Then Theorem 3.1 also follows.
4 Hardness of General SPE Computation
In this section, we show PSPACE-hardness of computing the SPE of a given sequential matching
game even if the length of each firm’s and worker’s preference list is at most three and the offering
order is restricted to position-based. Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. (3, 3)-SPEM is PSPACE-complete even if the problem is restricted to position-
based.
First of all, we can solve SPEM in polynomial space by implementing backward induction as
a depth-first search of the game tree. Thus, the problem is in class PSPACE.
In what follows, we prove the hardness by giving a reduction from QUANTIFIED 3SAT,
which is a PSPACE-complete problem [13]. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of variables and
(Q1v1)(Q2v2) · · · (Qnvn) ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) be a quantified Boolean formula. Here, Qi is either ∀
or ∃ for i = 1, . . . , n and ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) is a Boolean expression in 3-CNF. QUANTIFIED 3SAT
asks whether the given quantified Boolean formula is True or not. Let J∃ = {i | Qi = ∃} and
J∀ = {i | Qi = ∀}.
In our reduction, we create a position-based (3, 3)-SPEM instance (I, σ) with I = (P,Q,E,≺)
that consists of three phases—assignment, evaluation, and output—as shown in Fig. 3.
assignment phase
evaluation phase
output phase
s1x1 ≻s1 x¯1
...
snxn ≻sn x¯n
x1 t1 ≻x1 s1
...
xn tn ≻xn sn
...
...
...
r1· · · ≻r1 z1
...
rn· · · ≻rn zn
x¯1 s1 ≻x¯1 · · ·
...
x¯n sn ≻x¯n · · ·
...
t1z1 ≻t1 x1
...
tnzn ≻tn xn
z1 r1 ≻z1 t1
...
zn rn ≻zn tn
Figure 3: Framework of the reduction
In the assignment phase, for each Boolean variable vi ∈ V , we create two workers xi and
x¯i, whose actions correspond to an assignment of True or False to vi. Each xi has exactly
two acceptable firms si and ti with ti ≻xi si. Suppose that xi is the best and the worst choice
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for si and ti, respectively. Thus, xi must be matched at least to si in the matching SPE(I, σ)
(cf. Lemma 5.5). In addition, suppose that the best choice for x¯i is si and the second choice for
si is x¯i. Then, in the matching SPE(I, σ), x¯i matches to si if xi does not match to si.
Let π be the position order inducing σ such that it starts with s1, . . . , sn and ends with
t1, . . . , tn. Let ai ∈ {True,False} for each i = 1, . . . , n. For each 0 ≤ k ≤ n, let us denote
by (I, σ)[a1,...,ak] the subgame of (I, σ) just after s1, . . . , sk have finished their offers in which,
for each i = 1, . . . , k, the contraction of (si, xi) has occurred (i.e., xi has chosen ACCEPT for si’s
offer) if ai = True and the contraction of (si, x¯i) has occurred (i.e., xi has chosen REJECT for
si’s offer and then x¯i has chosen ACCEPT) if ai = False. Note that the subgames (I, σ)[a1,...,an]
correspond to the assignments to the variables v1, . . . , vn in a one-to-one manner.
In the evaluation phase, for each Boolean variable vi ∈ V , we create a firm ri and a worker
zi with (ri, zi) ∈ E. We will design the evaluation phase so that it correctly evaluates the
value of ϕ(a1, . . . , an) for every assignment (a1, . . . , an) ∈ {True,False}
n by the SPE of the
corresponding subgame (I, σ)[a1,...,an]. Formally, we prove the following claim.
Claim 4.2. One can design the evaluation phase in Fig. 3 so that, for any assignment (a1, . . . , an)
with the corresponding subgame (I ′, σ′) :− (I, σ)[a1,...,an], the following holds:
(i) for any i ∈ J∃, we have (ri, zi) ∈ SPE(I
′, σ′) ⇐⇒ ϕ(a1, . . . , an) = True, and
(ii) for any i ∈ J∀, we have (ri, zi) ∈ SPE(I
′, σ′) ⇐⇒ ϕ(a1, . . . , an) = False.
We postpone proving Claim 4.2, and suppose that we use the evaluation phase designed so.
The following claim shows whether each worker xi should choose ACCEPT for si’s offer or not.
Claim 4.3. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and any partial assignment (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∈ {True,False}
i−1,
define
ϕ′ :− (Qi+1vi+1) · · · (Qnvn) ϕ(a1, . . . , ai−1,False, vi+1, . . . , vn).
Then, in the corresponding subgame (I ′, σ′) :− (I, σ)[a1,...,ai−1],
(i) if i ∈ J∃, we have (si, x¯i) ∈ SPE(I
′, σ′) ⇐⇒ ϕ′ = True, and
(ii) if i ∈ J∀, we have (si, x¯i) ∈ SPE(I
′, σ′) ⇐⇒ ϕ′ = False.
Proof. We prove this by backward induction on i. The base case i = n holds by Claim 4.2
because xn gets an offer from tn (≻xn sn) if and only if (Qn, ϕ
′) = (∃,True) or (∀,False).
For a given 1 ≤ i < n, suppose that the claim holds for j ≥ i+ 1. By the induction hypothesis
and Claim 4.2, if xi chooses REJECT for si’s offer (note that then x¯i must choose ACCEPT for si’s
offer), then xi will be offered from ti (≻xi si) if and only if (Qi, ϕ
′) = (∃,True) or (∀,False).
Thus, the claim holds.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that Q1 = ∃ and v1 does not appear in the 3-CNF.
Then, x1 chooses REJECT for s1’s offer in the SPE if and only if the given QUANTIFIED 3SAT is
a YES-instance. Hence, deciding whether x1 chooses ACCEPT for the first offer σ(1) = (s1, x1)
in the SPE of (I, σ) is PSPACE-complete.
It remains to explain the details of the evaluation phase. Before the proof of Claim 4.2, we
prepare several gadgets as follows. We use gadgets to simulate AND, OR, and NOT-gates (see
Figs. 4, 5, and 6, respectively). Also, we use a gadget for branching, i.e., to make a copy of each
value (see Fig. 7). In our gadgets, an input is represented by a worker; she means True if and
only if she is matched with a firm outside the gadget when the first firm in the gadget moves.
An output is represented by a firm; it means True if and only if it is not matched to a worker
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Figure 4: AND-gate simulator ANDu
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Figure 5: OR-gate simulator ORu
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Figure 6: NOT-gate simulator NOTu
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Figure 7: Branching simulator BRANCHINGu
in the gadget when all the firms in the gadget have finished their offers. For each gadget, we
put an index u to distinguish individuals.
ANDu is a piece of a sequential matching game which consists of three firms P [ANDu] =
{αˆu1 , αˆ
u
2 , αˆ
u
3} and three workers Q[AND
u] = {αu1 , α
u
2 , α
u
3} with two input workers q and q
′ and
one output firm p. The set of acceptable pairs related to ANDu and the preferences of P [ANDu]∪
Q[ANDu] are defined as Fig. 4. Let argmax{σ−1(e) | e ∈ δI(q)} = (αˆ
u
1 , q), argmax{σ
−1(e) | e ∈
δI(q
′)} = (αˆu2 , q), and π
−1(αˆu1 ) < π
−1(αˆu2 ) < π
−1(αˆu3 ) < π
−1(p). Let us consider a subgame
where the first firm is αˆu1 . If both q and q
′ are already matched, then in the SPE matching
for this subgame, αˆui is matched with α
u
i for each i = 1, 2, 3, and hence p is not matched with
αu3 . On the other hand, if q or q
′ is not matched yet, then p is matched with αu3 in the SPE
matching for this subgame. The input-output relation is summarized in Fig. 8. Thus, we can
see ANDu as an AND-gate simulator.
ORu is a piece of a sequential matching game which consists of three firms P [ORu] =
{βˆu1 , βˆ
u
2 , βˆ
u
3 } and two workers Q[OR
u] = {βu1 , β
u
2 } with two input workers q and q
′ and one
output firm p. The set of acceptable pairs related to ORu and the preferences of P [ORu]∪Q[ORu]
are defined as Fig. 5. Let argmax{σ−1(e) | e ∈ δI(q)} = (βˆ
u
1 , q), argmax{σ
−1(e) | e ∈ δI(q
′)} =
(βˆu2 , q), and π
−1(βˆu1 ) < π
−1(βˆu2 ) < π
−1(βˆu3 ) < π
−1(p). Let us consider a subgame where the
first firm is βˆu1 . If q or q
′ is already matched, then in the SPE matching for this subgame, βu1 is
matched with βˆu1 or βˆ
u
2 , and β
u
2 is matched with βˆ
u
3 . Hence p is not matched with β
u
2 . On the
other hand, if neither q nor q′ is matched yet, then the SPE matching for this subgame contains
{(βˆu3 , β
u
1 ), (p, β
u
2 )}. The input-output relation is summarized in Fig. 9. Thus, we can see OR
u as
an OR-gate simulator.
NOTu is a piece of a sequential matching game which consists of five firms P [NOTu] =
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Figure 8: Input-output relation of ANDu
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Figure 9: Input-output relation of ORu
{γˆu1 , . . . , γˆ
u
5 } and three workers Q[NOT
u] = {γu1 , . . . , γ
u
4 } with one input worker q and one output
firm p. The set of acceptable pairs related to NOTu and the preferences of P [NOTu]∪Q[NOTu] are
defined as Fig. 6. Let argmax{σ−1(e) | e ∈ δI(q)} = (γˆ
u
1 , q) and π
−1(γˆu1 ) < · · · < π
−1(γˆu5 ) <
π−1(p). Let us consider a subgame (I ′, σ′) where the first firm is γˆu1 . If q is already matched, then
SPE(I ′, σ′) ∩ E[NOTu] = {(γˆu1 , γ
u
1 ), (γˆ
u
2 , γ
u
3 ), (γˆ
u
4 , γ
u
2 ), (p, γ
u
4 )}. Otherwise, i.e., q is not matched
yet, SPE(I ′, σ′) ∩ E[NOTu] = {(γˆu1 , q), (γˆ
u
2 , γ
u
4 ), (γˆ
u
3 , γ
u
2 ), (γˆ
u
4 , γ
u
3 ), (γˆ
u
5 , γ
u
1 )}. The input-output
relation is summarized in Fig. 10. Thus, we can see NOTu as a NOT-gate simulator.
BRANCHINGu is a piece of a sequential matching game which consists of five firms P [BRANCHINGu]
= {δˆu1 , . . . , δˆ
u
5 } and five workers Q[BRANCHING
u] = {δu1 , . . . , δ
u
5 } with one input worker q and two
output firms p and p′. The set of acceptable pairs related to BRANCHINGu and the preferences of
P [BRANCHINGu]∪Q[BRANCHINGu] are defined as Fig. 7. Let argmax{σ−1(e) | e ∈ δI(q)} = (δˆ
u
1 , q)
and π−1(δˆu1 ) < · · · < π
−1(δˆu5 ) < π
−1(p) < π−1(p′). Let us consider a subgame (I ′, σ′)
where the first firm is δˆu1 . If q is already matched, then SPE(I
′, σ′) ∩ E[BRANCHINGu] =
{(δˆui , δ
u
i ) | i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Otherwise, i.e., q is not matched yet, SPE(I
′, σ′)∩E[BRANCHINGu] =
{(δˆu1 , q), (δˆ
u
2 , δ
u
5 ), (δˆ
u
4 , δ
u
3 ), (δˆ
u
5 , δ
u
4 ), (p, δ
u
1 ), (p
′, δu2 )}. The input-output relation is summarized in
Fig. 11. Thus, we can see BRANCHINGu as a branching simulator.
Now, we are ready to design the evaluation phase required in Claim 4.2.
Proof of Claim 4.2. Let C = {C1, . . . , Cm} be the set of clauses for the given 3-CNF. For each
clause Cj ∈ C, let Cj = ℓj,1 ∨ ℓj,2 ∨ ℓj,3 such that ℓj,k ∈ {xλ(j,k), x¯λ(j,k)} (k = 1, 2, 3). Also, let
N+ = {(j, k) | ℓj,k = xλ(j,k), k ∈ {1, 2, 3}} and N
− = {(j, k) | ℓj,k = x¯λ(j,k), k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that λ(j, 1) < λ(j, 2) < λ(j, 3). We construct a
(3, 3)-SPEM instance (I, σ) as follows. In the instance, we use ANDu for u ∈ UAND :− {1, . . . ,m},
ORu for u ∈ UOR :−
⋃m
j=1{(j, 1), (j, 2)}, NOT
u for u ∈ UNOT :− N
− ∪ J∃, and BRANCHINGu for
u ∈ UBRANCHING :−
⋃m−1
j=1 {(1, j), . . . , (n, j)} ∪ {1, . . . , n − 1}. The set of firms and workers are
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Figure 10: Input-output relation of NOTu
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Figure 11: Input-output relation of BRANCHINGu
respectively defined as
P :− {s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tn, r1, . . . , rn, cˆ1, . . . , cˆm} ∪
n⋃
i=1
m⋃
j=1
{yˆi,j} ∪
m⋃
j=1
{ℓˆj,1, ℓˆj,2, ℓˆj,3}
∪
⋃
u∈UOR
P [ORu] ∪
⋃
u∈UAND
P [ANDu] ∪
⋃
u∈UNOT
P [NOTu] ∪
⋃
u∈UBRANCHING
P [BRANCHINGu]
and
Q :− {x1, . . . , xn, x¯1, . . . , x¯n, z1, . . . , zn, c1, . . . , cm} ∪
n⋃
i=1
m⋃
j=1
{yi,j} ∪
m⋃
j=1
{ℓj,1, ℓj,2, ℓj,3}
∪
⋃
u∈UOR
Q[ORu] ∪
⋃
u∈UAND
Q[ANDu] ∪
⋃
u∈UNOT
Q[NOTu] ∪
⋃
u∈UBRANCHING
Q[BRANCHINGu].
The input and output of each gadget are given as shown in Table 1. Moreover, the preferences
of the other firms and workers are given as follows:
si: xi ≻si x¯i (i = 1, . . . , n),
ℓˆj,k: yλ(j,k),j ≻ℓˆj,k ℓj,k ((j, k) ∈ N
+),
ℓˆj,k: γ
(j,k)
4 ≻ℓˆj,k ℓj,k ((j, k) ∈ N
−),
yˆi,j: δ
(i,j)
1 ≻yˆi,j yi,j (
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m−1),
yˆi,m: δ
(i,m−1)
2 ≻yˆi,m yi,m (i = 1, . . . , n),
cˆj: β
(j,2)
2 ≻cˆj cj (j = 1, . . . ,m),
ri: δˆ
i
1 ≻ri zi (i = 1, . . . , n− 1),
rn: δˆ
n−1
2 ≻ri zn,
ti: zi ≻ti xi (i = 1, . . . , n),
xi: ti ≻xi si (i = 1, . . . , n),
x¯i: si ≻x¯i δˆ
(i,1)
1 (i = 1, . . . , n),
yi,j:


yˆi,j ≻yi,j ℓˆj,k (if ℓj,k = xi),
yˆi,j ≻yi,j γˆ
(j,k)
1 (if ℓj,k = x¯i),
yˆi,j (otherwise),
c1: cˆ1 ≻c1 αˆ
1
1,
cj: cˆj ≻cj αˆ
j−1
2 (j = 2, . . . ,m),
zi: ri ≻zi ti (i = 1, . . . , n).
We define E and ≻ according to the above. Then, it is easy to check that the degree of each
firm or worker is at most three.
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Table 1: The input and output of the gadgets.
Input Output
BRANCHING(i,1) (i = 1, . . . , n) x¯i yˆi,1, δˆ
(i,2)
1
BRANCHING(i,j) ( i=1,...,nj=2,...,m−2) δ
(i,j−1)
2 yˆi,j, δˆ
(i,j+1)
1
BRANCHING(i,m−1) (i = 1, . . . , n) δ
(i,m−2)
2 yˆi,m−1, yˆi,m
NOT(j,k) ((j, k) ∈ N−) yλ(j,1),j ℓj,k
OR(j,1) (j = 1, . . . ,m) ℓj,1, ℓj,2 βˆ
(j,2)
1
OR(j,2) (j = 1, . . . ,m) β
(j,1)
2 , ℓj,3 cˆj
AND1 c1, c2 αˆ
2
1
ANDj (j = 2, . . . ,m− 2) αj−13 , cj+1 αˆ
j+1
1
ANDm−1 αm−23 , cm δˆ
1
1
BRANCHING1 αm−13
{
γˆ11 (if 1 ∈ A)
r1 (if 1 6∈ A)
, δˆ21
BRANCHINGi (i = 2, . . . , n− 2) δi−12
{
γˆi1 (if i ∈ A)
ri (if i 6∈ A)
, δˆi+11
BRANCHINGn−1 δn−22
{
γˆn−11 (if n− 1 ∈ A)
rn−1 (if n− 1 6∈ A)
,
{
γˆn1 (if n ∈ J
∃)
rm (if n ∈ J
∀)
NOTi (i ∈ J∃)
{
δi1 (if i < n)
δn−12 (if i = n)
ri
Let π be a position order that satisfies the conditions of ordering in each gadget and
{s1} → · · · → {sn} →
n⋃
i=1
m−1⋃
j=1
P [BRANCHING(i,j)]→
n⋃
i=1
m⋃
j=1
yˆi,j
→
⋃
(j,k)∈N−
P [NOT(j,k)]→
m⋃
j=1
{ℓˆj,1, ℓˆj,2, ℓˆj,3} →
m⋃
j=1
P [OR(j,1)]→
m⋃
j=1
P [OR(j,2)]→ {cˆ1, . . . , cˆm}
→
m⋃
j=1
P [ANDj]→
m−1⋃
j=1
P [BRANCHINGj ]→
⋃
i∈J∃
P [NOTi]→ {r1, . . . , rn} → {t1} → · · · → {tn},
where X → Y represents that π−1(x) < π−1(y) for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Let σ be the offering
order over E that is induced by π.
Then, yi,j is matched with yˆi,j if and only if x¯i is matched with si, i.e., vi is assigned False
(see Fig. 12). Also, ℓi is matched with ℓˆi if and only if ℓi corresponds to False and cj is matched
with cˆj if and only if Cj is unsatisfied (see Fig. 13). In addition, α
m−1
3 is matched with δˆ
1
1 if
and only if ϕ is satisfied (see Fig. 14). Therefore, we conclude that the constructed evaluation
phase satisfies the desired condition.
Thus, we have completed the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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Figure 12: Copy variables
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5 Leading SPE Matchings to Be Stable
As observed in Section 2.3, the SPE matching in our sequential matching model may violate
the stability condition, which is one of the desirable properties in two-sided matching that
represents a kind of fairness for all firms and workers. On the other hand, as we have seen in
Section 2.1, the SPE matching may differ according to offering orders. In this section, we show
that the worker-optimal stable matching can be led to as the outcome of an SPE by choosing an
appropriate offering order. Formally, we prove the following theorem, which is a reformulation
of Theorem 1.4.
Theorem 5.1. For any matching instance I, there exists an offering order σ ∈ ΣI such that
SPE(I, σ) = QOPT(I).
We give a constructive proof for Theorem 5.1 as follows. In Section 5.1, we construct an
offering order σ ∈ ΣI for a given matching instance I. In Section 5.2, we show useful lemmas.
Finally, in Section 5.3, we prove SPE(I, σ) = QOPT(I) for σ constructed in Section 5.1.
5.1 Constructing an Offering Order
Fix an arbitrary matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻). We shall construct an offering order
σ ∈ ΣI , for which we prove SPE(I, σ) = QOPT(I) in Section 5.3. The construction is two-
phased and sketched as follows: we first arrange all the offers preferable to the matched pairs in
QOPT(I) for the firms, and subsequently arrange the rest of the offers according to a position
order that is defined by the acceptance order in Algorithm 1 for computing QOPT(I).
Let F :− {(p, q) ∈ E | q ≻p QOPT(I)(p)} ⊆ E \ QOPT(I). We arrange the offers in F
prior to all the matched pairs in QOPT(I). Formally, suppose that σ−1(e) < σ−1(e∗) holds for
every e ∈ F and e∗ ∈ QOPT(I), i.e., we restrict ourselves to offering orders σ ∈ ΣI such that
F = {σ(i) | i = 1, 2, . . . , |F |}. We then denote by (I ′, σ′) the subgame obtained by deleting all
the pairs in F . Note that we see QOPT(I ′) = QOPT(I) by applying Properties 2.10 and 2.13
repeatedly, and for every (p, q) ∈ QOPT(I ′), the worker q is on the top of p’s list in I ′.
In what follows, let us construct a position order π over P that induces an offering order
σ′ ∈ ΣI′ over E \F . Recall that, for a matching instance Iˆ, the worker-optimal stable matching
QOPT(Iˆ) is computed by Algorithm 1, and let α(Iˆ) denote the set of firms p ∈ P that accept
QOPT(Iˆ)(p)’s proposal in the earliest iteration step (in the sense of while in Line 2) among
the firms matched in QOPT(Iˆ).
Let k :− |QOPT(I ′)|. We construct a sequence of matching instances Ii (i = 0, 1, . . . , k) as
follows:
• let I0 :− I
′, whose worker-optimal stable matching is the target matching here, and
• for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, take a matched pair ei = (pi, qi) ∈ QOPT(Ii−1) with pi ∈ α(Ii−1)
and let Ii :− Ii−1/ei, which is, intuitively, a subinstance after the pair ei ∈ QOPT(Ii−1)
matched first in Algorithm 1 leaves the market.
Since Lemma 5.3 (shown in Section 5.2) guarantees QOPT(Ii) = QOPT(Ii−1) − ei, we have
QOPT(I ′) = {e1, e2, . . . , ek}, and Ik has no acceptable pair (otherwise, an acceptable pair in Ik
blocks QOPT(I ′) in I ′, contradicting the stability).
We now define a position order π over P that induces σ′ as follows:
• π(i) :− pi for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, and
• for i = k + 1, . . . , |P |, take any firm p ∈ P \ {π(1), π(2), . . . , π(i − 1)} and let π(i) :− p.
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Note that π(1), π(2), . . . , π(k) are the firms matched in QOPT(I ′).
Thus, extending the position-based offering order σ′ ∈ ΣI′ induced by π by arranging the
offers in F arbitrarily at the beginning, we obtain an offering order σ ∈ ΣI .
It is worth remarking that the above construction is done in polynomial time. In the first
phase, computing and arranging the offers in F are done in O(|E|) time by a single execution
of Algorithm 1 and by picking the top worker of the list of some firm repeatedly. In the second
phase, k = O(|V |) executions of Algorithm 1 are sufficient for constructing the sequence Ii
(i = 0, 1, . . . , k) and the position order π. Thus, the total computational time is bounded by
O(|V | · |E|).
5.2 Useful Lemmas
We first show two lemmas on the worker-optimal stable matching.
The first one adjusts a well-known property, called the blocking lemma [12], to our situation,
and the proof is almost the same. Recall that, for two matchings µ, µ′ ∈ MI in a matching
instance I = (P,Q,E,≻), we write µ ≻Q µ
′ if µ 6= µ′ and µ(q) q µ
′(q) for every worker q ∈ Q.
Lemma 5.2 (cf. blocking lemma [12]). Let I = (P,Q,E,≻) be a matching instance. For a
matching µ′ ∈ MI with µ
′ ≻Q QOPT(I), define Q
′ :− {q ∈ Q | µ′(q) ≻q QOPT(I)(q)}. Then,
µ′ is blocked by some pair (p, q) ∈ E with p ∈ µ′(Q′) and q ∈ Q \ Q′ such that no worker
q˜ ∈ ΓI(p) satisfies both QOPT(I)(p) ≻p q˜ ≻p q and p ≻q˜ QOPT(I)(q˜).
Proof. Let P ′ :− µ′(Q′) = QOPT(I)(Q′). Take a firm p ∈ P ′ that accepts QOPT(I)(p)’s
proposal at last among P ′ in Algorithm 1 (where some ambiguity remains due to the order
of choices of p ∈ P in Line 5, but it does not matter in the following argument). Let q′ :−
µ′(p) ∈ Q′. By definition of p, the proposal to p from any q′′ ∈ Q′ with p ≻q′′ QOPT(I)(q
′′) is
rejected in some strictly earlier iteration step (in the sense of while in Line 2) than QOPT(I)(p)
proposes to p, because q′′ proposes to QOPT(I)(q′′) ∈ Q′ (and the proposal is accepted) after
the rejection. Hence, there exists a worker q ∈ Q\Q′ with QOPT(I)(p) ≻p q ≻p q
′ = µ′(p) ∈ Q′
and p ≻q QOPT(I)(q) = µ
′(q), which implies that (p, q) ∈ E blocks µ′. If we choose q as the top
in p’s list among such workers, then no worker q˜ ∈ ΓI(p) satisfies both QOPT(I)(p) ≻p q˜ ≻p q
and p ≻q˜ QOPT(I)(q˜).
The second one is directly used for our construction of a position order π in Section 5.1.
Recall that, for a matching instance I, we denote by α(I) the set of firms p that accept
QOPT(I)(p)’s proposal in the earliest iteration step (in the sense of while in Line 2) among
the firms matched in QOPT(I).
Lemma 5.3. Let I = (P,Q,E,≻) be a matching instance in which q is on the top of p’s list
for every pair (p, q) ∈ QOPT(I). Then, for any pair e∗ = (p∗, q∗) ∈ QOPT(I) with p∗ ∈ α(I),
we have QOPT(I/e∗) = QOPT(I)− e∗.
Proof. Let µ :− QOPT(I) and µ′ :− QOPT(I/e∗)+e∗, and suppose to the contrary that µ′ 6= µ.
Then, µ′ ≻Q µ by Property 2.12, and let Q
′ :− {q ∈ Q | µ′(q) ≻q µ(q)}. Note that q
∗ 6∈ Q′
because µ(q∗) = µ′(q∗) = p∗. By Lemma 5.2, µ′ is blocked by some pair (p, q) ∈ E with
p ∈ µ′(Q′) and q ∈ Q \ Q′ such that no worker q˜ ∈ ΓI(p) satisfies both µ(p) ≻p q˜ ≻p q and
p ≻q˜ µ(q˜). Then, q’s proposal to p (≻q µ
′(q) = µ(q)) is rejected only when (or after) p accepts
µ(p)’s proposal in Algorithm 1, and hence q proposes to µ(q) in a strictly later iteration step
than p accepts µ(p)’s proposal. This implies q 6= q∗ because µ(q∗) = p∗ ∈ α(I). However, if
q ∈ Q \ (Q′ ∪ {q∗}), then (p, q) ∈ E/e∗ blocks µ′ − e∗ in I/e∗, a contradiction.
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We next observe several properties of SPE matchings. First, we see that a blocking pair for
an SPE matching is restricted to a certain type.
Lemma 5.4. For a sequential matching game (I, σ), let µ :− SPE(I, σ). Then, an acceptable
pair (p, q) blocks µ (i.e., q ≻p µ(p) and p ≻q µ(q)) only if σ
−1((p, q)) > σ−1((µ(q), q)).
Proof. We prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose that q ≻p µ(p), p ≻q µ(q), and
σ−1((p, q)) < σ−1((µ(q), q)). Let us consider the subgame (I ′, σ′) of (I, σ) that is reached in the
SPE where σ′(1) = (p, q). Here, the subgame (I ′, σ′) exists because σ−1((p, q)) < σ−1((µ(q), q))
but p and q are not matched by q ≻p µ(p). The optimal strategy of q at (I
′, σ′) is ACCEPT since
p ≻q µ(q); however, q selects REJECT in the SPE, which is a contradiction.
The next one is analogous to Property 2.10 on the worker-optimal stable matchings, and it
can be also interpreted as the first-choice stability5 for the firms.
Lemma 5.5. For a sequential matching game (I, σ), let e = (p, q) be an acceptable pair such
that q is on the top of p’s list. Then, SPE(I, σ)(q) q p.
Proof. We prove this by induction on σ−1(e). For the base case σ−1(e) = 1, by Proposi-
tion 2.4, the worker q selects REJECT if SPE(I − e, σ − e) ≻q p, and ACCEPT otherwise. Hence,
SPE(I, σ)(q) q p.
Suppose that σ−1(e) > 1. Let σ(1) = e′ = (p′, q′). Note that p′ 6= p since q is on the top of
p’s list. By Proposition 2.4 (i), if SPE(I − e′, σ − e′)(q′) ≻q′ p
′, then we derive from induction
hypothesis
SPE(I, σ)(q) = SPE(I − e′, σ − e′)(q) q p.
Similarly, by Proposition 2.4 (ii), if SPE(I − e′, σ − e′)(q′) ≺q′ p
′ and q′ 6= q, then we derive
SPE(I, σ)(q) = SPE(I/e′, σ/e′)(q) q p.
Otherwise, we have q′ = q and p′ ≻q SPE(I − e
′, σ − e′)(q) ≻q p by induction hypothesis, and
hence q selects ACCEPT, i.e., SPE(I, σ)(q) = p′ ≻q p. Thus we are done.
We can similarly show the following proposition, which states that top-top pairs are matched
in the SPE matching and can be removed anytime. This implies that, if a matching instance
satisfies the Eeckhout condition6, the SPE matching coincides with a unique stable matching
regardless of the offering order.
Proposition 5.6. For a sequential matching game (I, σ), let e = (p, q) be an acceptable
pair such that each of them is the most preferred partner of the other. Then, SPE(I, σ) =
SPE(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q).
Proof. We prove this by induction on σ−1(e). The base case σ−1(e) = 1 is trivial. Suppose that
σ−1(e) > 1, and let σ(1) = e′ = (p′, q′). Note that p′ 6= p since q is most preferred by p. By
Proposition 2.4 (i), if SPE(I − e′, σ − e′)(q′) ≻q′ p
′, then we have
SPE(I, σ) = SPE(I − e′, σ − e′)
= SPE((I − e′)/e, (σ − e′)/e) + (p, q) (induction hypothesis)
= SPE((I/e) − e′, (σ/e) − e′) + (p, q) (Observation 2.3)
= SPE(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q),
5A matching µ ∈ MI is first-choice stable for the firms (resp., the workers) if µ is not blocked by any pair
(p, q) such that q is on the top of p’s list (resp., p is on the top of q’s list) [8]. An SPE matching may not be
first-choice stable for the workers, e.g., Example 2.21 in Section 2.3.
6 The Eeckhout condition is a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique stable matching. We say that a
matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻) satisfies the Eeckhout condition if it is possible to rearrange firms and workers
so that (i) for any firm pk ∈ P , qi ≻pk qj for all j > i, and (ii) for any worker qk ∈ Q, pi ≻qk pj for all j > i [9].
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where the last equality follows from SPE((I/e)−e′, (σ/e)−e′)(q′) = SPE(I−e′, σ−e′)(q′) ≻q′ p
′,
which is implied by the second equality. Similarly, by Proposition 2.4 (ii), we have SPE(I, σ) =
SPE(I/e′, σ/e′) + (p′, q′) = SPE((I/e′)/e, (σ/e′)/e) + (p′, q′) + (p, q) = SPE(I/e, σ/e) + (p, q) if
SPE(I − e′, σ − e′)(q′) ≺q′ p
′. Hence, the proposition holds.
5.3 Correctness
We here prove that SPE(I, σ) = QOPT(I) for σ ∈ ΣI constructed in Section 5.1. Recall
that the construction is two-phased: we first arrange the offers in F = {(p, q) ∈ E | q ≻p
QOPT(I)(p)} ⊆ E \ QOPT(I) prior to the others, and the order σ′ ∈ ΣI′ on the rest offers is
induced by a position order π over P in which the firms matched in QOPT(I ′) are arranged
prior to the unmatched firms.
The following claim implies that all the offers in F are supposed to be rejected as long as σ′
is designed appropriately, where recall that QOPT(I ′) = QOPT(I) follows from Properties 2.10
and 2.13.
Claim 5.7. If SPE(I ′, σ′) = QOPT(I ′), then SPE(I, σ) = QOPT(I).
Proof. We show the claim by induction on |F |. When F = ∅, it trivially holds. Then, it suffices
to show that, for the first offer σ(1) = e = (p, q) ∈ F , the worker q selects REJECT in the
SPE when F 6= ∅. By induction hypothesis and Property 2.10, we see SPE(I − e, σ − e)(q) =
QOPT(I)(q) ≻q p, which concludes that q indeed selects REJECT in the SPE.
We then prove that σ′ is indeed designed appropriately, which concludes SPE(I, σ) =
QOPT(I) by combining with Claim 5.7.
Claim 5.8. SPE(I ′, σ′) = QOPT(I ′).
Proof. Recall that we construct a sequence of matching instances Ii (i = 0, 1, . . . , k), where
k = |QOPT(I ′)|, such that
• I0 = I
′,
• Ii = Ii−1/ei for some ei = (pi, qi) ∈ QOPT(Ii−1) with π(i) = pi ∈ α(Ii−1) for i =
1, 2, . . . , k,
• QOPT(Ii) = QOPT(Ii−1)− ei for i = 1, 2, . . . , k (by Lemma 5.3), and
• Ik has no acceptable pair.
We show SPE(Ii, σi) = QOPT(Ii) by induction on i (in descending order), where σi ∈ ΣIi
denotes the restriction of σ to Ii. The base case SPE(Ik, σk) = ∅ = QOPT(Ik) is trivial, and
the case of i = 0 is exactly what we want to prove. As each step of the induction, it suffices to
show the next claim, which says that qi select ACCEPT for the first offer σi−1(1) = ei = (pi, qi)
in the SPE of (Ii−1, σi−1).
Claim 5.9. pi = QOPT(Ii−1)(qi) ≻qi SPE(Ii−1 − ei, σi−1 − ei)(qi) for every i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Proof. Let µ′ :− SPE(Ii−1 − ei, σi−1 − ei), and suppose to the contrary that µ
′(qi) ≻qi pi =
QOPT(Ii−1)(qi). For each worker qj (j > i) (who is matched in QOPT(Ii−1)− ei), Lemma 5.5
implies that µ′(qj) qj QOPT(Ii−1)(qj) because qj is on the top of pj’s list in Ii−1 − ei. In
addition, for any other worker q ∈ Q \ {q1, q2, . . . , qk}, obviously µ
′(q) q q = QOPT(Ii−1)(q).
Hence, we have µ′ ≻Qi QOPT(Ii−1), where Qi :− Q \ {q1, q2, . . . , qi−1}.
Let Q′i :− {q ∈ Qi | µ
′(q) ≻q QOPT(Ii−1)(q)}. Note that qi ∈ Q
′
i. By Lemma 5.2, µ
′ is
blocked by some pair (p, q) ∈ E with p ∈ µ′(Q′i) and q ∈ Qi \Q
′
i such that no worker q˜ ∈ ΓIi(p)
26
satisfies both QOPT(Ii−1)(p) ≻p q˜ ≻p q and p ≻q˜ QOPT(Ii−1)(q˜). By Lemma 5.4, we have
σ−1i−1((p, q)) > σ
−1
i−1((µ
′(q), q)), which is equivalent to π−1(p) > π−1(µ′(q)). This, however,
cannot hold, because when applying Algorithm 1 to any instance Ij (j ≥ i− 1) in which both p
and µ′(q) = QOPT(Ii−1)(q) remain, q proposes to QOPT(Ij)(q) = QOPT(Ii−1)(q) in a strictly
later iteration step than is rejected by p (≻q µ
′(q) = QOPT(Ij)(q)), which is no earlier than p
accepts the proposal from QOPT(Ij)(p) = QOPT(Ii−1)(p).
Thus, we have proved Claim 5.8, which completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Note that Claim 5.8 also leads to the following corollary, which corresponds to a special case
when F = ∅ holds for a given instance I in Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.10. For any matching instance I such that for every pair (p, q) ∈ QOPT(I) the
worker q is on the top of the firm p’s list, there exists a position-based offering order σ ∈ ΣI
such that SPE(I, σ) = QOPT(I).
We conclude this section with the following conjecture, which generalizes this corollary. The
offering order σ constructed in Section 5.1 looks somewhat artificial, and if one can achieve the
same property by a position-based order, it is further natural in the sense of designing markets.
Conjecture 5.11. For any matching instance I, there exists a position-based offering order
σ ∈ ΣI such that SPE(I, σ) = QOPT(I).
6 Impossibility to Achieve Socially Desirable Matchings by SPEs
In this section, we give some impossibility results. We show that the SPE matchings for a match-
ing instance may not support the firm-optimal stable matching, any (firm-side and worker-side)
Pareto-efficient matching, and any (firm-side and worker-side) first-choice maximal matching,
which are defined successively in Definitions 6.1–6.3.
Let I = (P,Q,E,≻) be a matching instance. Recall that, for matchings µ, µ′ ∈ MI , we
write µ Q µ
′ if µ(q) q µ
′(q) (∀q ∈ Q), and write µ ≻Q µ
′ if µ 6= µ′ in addition. Similarly, we
write µ P µ
′ if µ(p) p µ
′(p) (∀p ∈ P ), and write µ ≻P µ
′ if µ 6= µ′ in addition. Also similar
to Definition 2.9, we can define the firm-optimal stable matching.
Definition 6.1 (Optimality (cf. Definition 2.9)). The set of all stable matchings in I forms
a distributive lattice with respect to the partial order P . A unique maximal element in this
distributive lattice is said to be firm-optimal and denoted by POPT(I). That is, POPT(I)(p) p
µ(p) for any stable matching µ in I and any firm p ∈ P .
Definition 6.2 (Pareto-efficiency). A matching µ ∈ MI is called firm-side (resp., worker-side)
Pareto-efficient if no matching µ′ ∈ MI \ {µ} satisfies µ ≻P µ
′ (resp., µ ≻Q µ
′). We denote the
set of firm-side (resp., worker-side) Pareto-efficient matchings by PEP (I) (resp., PEQ(I)).
Definition 6.3 (First-choice maximality [8]). For a matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻), let
EP := {(p, q) ∈ E | q is on the top of p’s list} andEQ := {(p, q) ∈ E | p is on the top of q’s list}.
A matching µ ∈ MI is said to be firm-side (resp., worker-side) first-choice maximal if |µ∩EP | ≥
|µ′ ∩ EP | (resp., |µ ∩ EQ| ≥ |µ
′ ∩ EQ|) for all µ
′ ∈ MI . We denote the set of firm-side (resp.,
worker-side) first-choice maximal matchings by FCMP (I) (resp., FCMQ(I)).
For a matching instance I, let SPE(I) be the set of matchings supported by SPEs of the
sequential matching games with I, i.e., SPE(I) := {SPE(I, σ) | σ ∈ ΣI}. Note that, as we saw
in Section 5, the worker-optimal stable matching is always leadable as the outcome of an SPE,
i.e., QOPT(I) ∈ SPE(I) for every I.
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We are ready to state our impossibility results that there exist matching instances in which
the following properties cannot be achieved by any SPE matching: the firm-optimality under
stability, the (firm-side and worker-side) Pareto-efficiency, and the (firm-side and worker-side)
first-choice maximality.
Proposition 6.4. There exists a matching instance I such that POPT(I) 6∈ SPE(I).
Proof. See Example 6.7.
Proposition 6.5. There exist matching instance I and I ′ such that SPE(I)∩PEP (I) = ∅ and
SPE(I ′) ∩ PEQ(I ′) = ∅.
Proof. See Example 6.7 for the firm-side and Example 6.8 for the worker-side.
Proposition 6.6. There exist matching instances I and I ′ such that SPE(I) ∩ FCMP (I) = ∅
and SPE(I ′) ∩ FCMQ(I ′) = ∅.
Proof. See Example 6.7 for the firm-side and Example 6.8 for the worker-side.
Example 6.7 (Proof of Proposition 6.4 and the firm-side parts of Propositions 6.5 and 6.6).
Let us consider a matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻) with two firms P = {p1, p2} and two
workers Q = {q1, q2} where E = P ×Q and the preferences are
p1 : q2 ≻p1 q1 q1 : p1 ≻q1 p2
p2 : q1 ≻p2 q2 q2 : p2 ≻q2 p1.
In this instance, there are two stable matchings QOPT(I) = {(p1, q1), (p2, q2)} and POPT(I) =
{(p1, q2), (p2, q1)}.
By symmetry, without loss of generality, we may assume that the first offer is (p1, q2). Then,
there are three possible offering orders σ1, σ2, and σ3:(
σ1(1), σ1(2), σ1(3), σ1(4)
)
=
(
(p1, q2), (p1, q1), (p2, q1), (p2, q2)
)
,(
σ2(1), σ2(2), σ2(3), σ2(4)
)
=
(
(p1, q2), (p2, q1), (p1, q1), (p2, q2)
)
,(
σ3(1), σ3(2), σ3(3), σ3(4)
)
=
(
(p1, q2), (p2, q1), (p2, q2), (p1, q1)
)
.
It is easy to compute that SPE(I, σi) = QOPT(I) for i = 1, 2, 3 as shown in Fig. 15. Hence,
SPE(I) = {QOPT(I)} and POPT(I) 6∈ SPE(I). In addition, SPE(I) ∩ PEP (I) = SPE(I) ∩
FCMP (I) = ∅ because PEP (I) = FCMP (I) = {POPT(I)}.
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Figure 15: The tree representation of the games in Example 6.7 with offering orders σ1, σ2, and
σ3. The bold red edges indicate the SPEs.
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Example 6.8 (Proof of the worker-side parts of Propositions 6.5 and 6.6). Let us consider
a matching instance I = (P,Q,E,≻) with two firms P = {p1, p2} and three workers Q =
{q1, q2, q3} where E = P ×Q and the preferences are
p1 : q1 ≻p1 q3 ≻p1 q2 q1 : p2 ≻q1 p1
p2 : q2 ≻p2 q3 ≻p2 q1 q2 : p1 ≻q2 p2
q3 : p1 ≻q3 p2.
We claim that SPE(I) =
{
{(p1, q1), (p2, q2)}
}
(= {QOPT(I)}) by contradiction. Suppose that
SPE(I, σ∗) 6= {(p1, q1), (p2, q2)} for some σ
∗ ∈ ΣI . Then, at least one of the offers (p1, q1) and
(p2, q2) is rejected on the path according to the SPE of the game (I, σ
∗). If q1 chooses REJECT for
the offer (p1, q1), then she must match with a firm better than p1 (i.e., p2) in the SPE matching.
This implies that q2 also chooses REJECT for the offer (p2, q2) on the SPE path, and hence q2
must match with p1 in the SPE matching. However, this is impossible because q3 would choose
ACCEPT for the offer (p1, q3). By similar arguments, we can obtain a contradiction for the case
when q2 chooses REJECT for the offer (p2, q2). Hence, SPE(I) =
{
{(p1, q1), (p2, q2)}
}
.
Here, we have
PEQ(I) =
{
{(p1, q2), (p2, q1)}, {(p1, q3), (p2, q1)}, {(p1, q2), (p2, q3)}, {(p1, q3), (p2, q2)}
}
,
FCMQ(I) =
{
{(p1, q2), (p2, q1)}, {(p1, q3), (p2, q1)}
}
.
Thus, we obtain SPE(I) ∩ PEQ(I) = SPE(I) ∩ FCMQ(I) = ∅.
It should be noted that, by combining Examples 6.7 and 6.8, one can construct a matching
instance I such that SPE(I)∩ ({POPT(I)} ∪PEP (I)∪PEQ(I)∪FCMP (I)∪FCMQ(I)) = ∅.
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